The truth behind one of our most authoritarian pieces of legislation yet.

JJ STARKY

The Online Safety Act has been in the works since 2017.

It all began, as so much invasive, wide-reaching legislation does, with tragedy.

In 2017, a 14-year-old girl by the name of Molly Russell started consuming dark content online. Themes of self-harm and suicide relentlessly bombarded her feed, pulling her into despair.

She fell into a pit of severe depression. Months later, unable to escape its grip, little Molly took her own life. Reports didn’t state specifically how she died, only that it involved “self-harm”.

Her father, Ian Russell, emerged as a fierce advocate for online safety in the aftermath, criticising how social media firms operate around engagement. His campaigning gained national attention, culminating in government response.

Theresa May’s government had already published plans to address online safety the month before Molly’s suicide. Her Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Dame Karen Bradley, had released the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper.

Aiming to make Britain the “safest place” to be online, the paper outlined plans of a voluntary code for social media companies to tackle abuse, annual reports on harmful content and responses, and a levy on tech firms to fund awareness campaigns.

Education was also key—integrating digital literacy into schools curricula for parents, children, and caregivers alike.

The initial recommendations placed some burdens on social media firms, but they were far from draconian. They contained some inconvenient safeguards but ones arguably needed.

Then, the tide shifted.

By April 2019, Theresa May’s Home Office and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport were involved, co-publishing the Online Harms White Paper. With ministers citing Molly’s fate, the scope of their plans expanded.

It was here we first saw proposals of a legal obligation for companies to take reasonable steps to safeguard users from illegal content, underage exposure to legal content and—the big one—“harmful but legal content”.

The mandate was widened to seemingly include almost everything.

They also proposed the establishment of an independent regulator to oversee compliance, develop codes of practice, and have the authority to impose sanctions on companies failing to meet their new rules.

This is what came into force on Monday (17th March 2025), with tech companies needing to complete compulsory illegal content risk assessments, showing how their algorithms downgrade certain content.

Failure to do so could result in fines up to £18 million or 10% of their worldwide revenue.

After subsequent draftings of the bill in 2021 and legislative amendments in parliament in 2022, the bill, dubbed The Online Safety Act, passed through parliament and received Royal Assent in October 2023.

Campaigners successfully pressured representatives to withdraw the “harmful but legal” provision, citing its vague and subjective nature that would have no doubt had a damning effect on online speech.

It marked a solid win. But while attention fixated on the former, the government, civil service, and stakeholders successfully pushed through more, let’s say, insidious clauses.

New Criminal Offences

One of those was Section 179, which introduced a brand new criminal offence for “knowingly sending false information” that causes “non-trivial psychological or physical harm”.

The provision obviously intends to prevent things like cyber-bulling. What we didn’t know was that it would be used by police forces to arrest citizens for speculation. You read that right.

The story of Bernadette “Bernie” Spofforth is a case in point.

On July 29th 2024, Bernie misidentified Southport child-murderer Axel Rudakubana as Ali-Al-Shakati on X hours after the heinous attack. About a week later, Cheshire Police arrested her for “stirring up racial hatred” and “false communications”.

Now, the force genuinely did not have any evidence that Bernie “knowingly” sent false communications that “caused non-trivial psychological or physical harm”. Nor, it turns out, did they have proof of “false communications”.

Bernie prefaced her X post with—wait for it—“if this is true”. Meaning, though she categorically declared she did not know the child-murderer’s identity, she was arrested, at least partially, for speculating on it.

She was reportedly held in jail for 36 hours after “being dragged” from her home. The police eventually dropped the case.

Cutting the story short: we went from voluntary social media codes to attempts to censor “legal but harmful” content for all (not just children), to a draconian speech law—one that allowed a seemingly politicised police force to arrest a citizen for airing rumour and arguably violate her human rights in the process.

The maximum penalty for a false communications offence under Section 179 is 51 weeks in prison, a fine, or both. Worse, as a summary-only offence, defendants lose the right to a jury trial, like Section 127 of 2003 Communications Act before it.

Instead, a lay magistrate or district judge decides their fate—without the scrutiny or safeguards a jury provides, thus, stripping away a considerable degree of due process and opening up sentences to judicial bias.

Section 181 of the Online Safety Act also creates a new criminal offence: sending “seriously threatening messages” online. While it’s framed as a way to tackle harmful content, the law goes further—criminalising any threat “intended to cause fear or distress”.

This includes threats of death, serious injury, sexual assault, rape, and, notably, threats of serious financial loss or damage to property.

Death and sexual assault sure, but financial loss? What qualifies? A joke about boycotting a business? A satirical meme aimed at a politician’s donors?

If the prior police’s arrest of a veteran for “malicious communications” over a meme—an LGBTQ+ flag shaped like a swastika that allegedly “caused someone anxiety”—is any indication, it’s clear it might extend to similarly trivial acts.

The punishment for breaking Section 181 is up to 5 years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both. Serious offences are tried in the Crown Courts with juries while others are tried in the Magistrates without.

In 2023, close pal of former Health Secretary Matt Hancock, hereditary peer Lord James Bethell even attempted to criminalise “vaccine misinformation” by adding it to the bill. The same bloke who “replaced” his phone when questions arose about £85 million contracts he awarded for covid tests.

Unfortunately, the overreach didn’t stop there. The political class baked in yet more wide-reaching and punitive provisions.

Preferential Application

While independent journalists and social media commentators face content restrictions, Section 50 exempts “recognised news publishers” (i.e., mainstream media) from fines for potentially harmful material.

Online platforms are not obligated to apply their new safety duties to content from recognised news publishers. So The Guardian won’t be subject to the same regulation.

This also includes prosecution under “false communication” offences.

Put simply, if a mainstream journalist knowingly posts false information that causes “harm”, he/she cannot be arrested. Little citizen journalist Billy, however, doing the same on his blog or social media profile could be.

Advocates of the Act contended it makes sense because mainstream media outlets are rigorously regulated by the “independent” IPSO or IMPRESS.

Empowerment of Ofcom (and Starmer’s Cabinet)

Then there’s the simultaneous expansion of power for Ofcom—the government-approved regulator for broadcasting, internet, telecommunications, and postal services—paired with a reduction in its “independence”.

In February 2020, before the first version of the Online Safety Bill was published and introduced to Parliament for pre-legislative scrutiny, Boris Johnson’s government made Ofcom the enforcer of the Act.

It gave the regulator huge control over how social media operates, including what stays online and what gets removed, despite them having no prior experience regulating content on this scale.

Not only that, in its final iteration, the Act granted secretaries the authority to direct Ofcom in its regulatory functions, including influencing codes of practice.

Ofcom is called an “independent” regulator, but it is ultimately accountable to parliament and the government. It was established by the government in 2003 and reports to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT).

The government also appoints Ofcom’s board members, including the Chair and Chief Executive.

In short, its independence was arguably non-existent already. The Online Safety Act further crushed any glimmer that it was.

Melanie Dawes, Ofcom’s current Chief Executive, has come under heavy fire in recent years. The former Permanent Secretary Champion for Diversity and Inclusion has been accused of bias regulation, including imposing inconsistent and selective fines and unfairly dismissing complaints.

To give you a taste, in 2022, Dawes and co fined GB News for comments made by a guest on presenter Mark Steyn’s show about the Covid response and pre-Nazi Germany.

When other hosts and guests, like LBC’s James O’Brien, directly compared Donald Trump to past fascist leaders, on the other hand, Ofcom was no where to be seen.

Another famously unbalanced ruling: in 2022, Toby Young and Laura Dodsworth lodged complaints later that year over Sky’s partnership with the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT)—part owned by the UK Cabinet Office.

Sky and BIT’s collaboration in 2021 aimed to subtly “nudge” viewers, targeting kids, to back the government’s Net Zero agenda, a tactic Young and Dodsworth argued broke Ofcom’s rules.

Four months later, Ofcom dismissed the complaint, deeming climate science “broadly settled,” suggesting psychological manipulation is acceptable, as long as the message aligns with the “scientific consensus”.

It might come as little surprise that Dawes has also worked with The Patchwork Foundation, a group “focused on communities and individuals that are traditionally underrepresented”.

Dawes can not only set and alter legally binding codes of practice (within a certain scope) that social media platforms, websites and even search engines must follow, but she can fine them heavily for breaking those codes.

Put plainly, censorship powers have been concentrated in the hands of a single, seemingly compromised career civil servant. She interprets the rules, amends, and enforces them.

And if the government is unhappy with Dawes’ enforcement style, Starmer’s partisan secretaries can step in by law—potentially pressuring her into imposing regulations that align with their agenda more closely.

Empowerment of Police Chiefs

 

Of course, this doesn’t include the powers granted to police chiefs, who can selectively arrest citizens on suspicion of “knowingly sending false communications” causing “non-trivial psychological or physical harm.” Or, indeed, arrest citizens they suspect of sending “seriously threatening messages” online “intending to cause fear or distress”.

Given Bernie’s case and the recent testimony of arrests and police intimidation following the Southport protests and riots, it constitutes yet another subjective and restrictive speech law that politically-captured police forces can use to punish almost anyone, for anything.

Don’t get me wrong. There are some positives.

The Act does target online content that commentators across the political spectrum agree should be removed, including child sexual abuse material, terrorism-related content, revenge porn, non-consensual intimate images, and the promotion of self-harm or suicide.

But the main problem: it also extends to “hate crimes”—a concept that our government and policing establishment have repeatedly shown they’re incapable of enforcing impartially and without fundamentally undermining free speech rights.

The vague terms, such as “harmful”, “democratic importance”, and “reasonable steps” peppered throughout the Act compounds the problem.

Put another way: the authoritarian powers it enables for any government to exploit simply outweigh the benefits proponents claim the Act offers.

Subversion of Privacy Rights

 

Privacy rights have also been dented.

Section 122 forces online platforms to deploy technology that detects and removes illegal content, even within end-to-end encrypted messages.

End-to-end encryption ensures only the sender and recipient can read communications. Content scanning within these channels will inevitably weaken encryption.

As a result, users face greater risks of cyber threats, hacking, and unauthorised surveillance—the same dangers Labour Home Secretary Yvette Cooper’s recent successful push to access Apple users’ iCloud data enabled.

Elsewhere, platforms must implement technology to verify every user’s age, thereby effectively “age-gating” websites and setting the stage for more invasive verification checks.

Disproportionate Effects

Finally, we come to the issue of proportion.

The Act imposes such sweeping obligations on online platforms, covering any “user-to-user service” that allows user-generated content to be seen by others, that smaller platforms, websites, and blogs have already been shutting down.

From cycling to gaming, birdwatching to history, various UK-based online forums are disappearing. They simply can’t afford moderation teams, legal compliance, or even the time to navigate the Act’s vague language.

The law is so broad that many forums—both in the UK and beyond—are switching to read-only mode or geo-blocking UK users entirely. Compliance isn’t a matter of difficulty. It’s impossible for them.

In January, the Labour government passed an amendment setting user number thresholds to determine which websites, search engines, and platforms fall under the Act—but the details remain unclear. We now have to wait until summer for Ofcom to spell it out.

Wider Context

 

Last November, in the wake of the frenzy of questionable and prompt guilty pleas and mass sentences for non-violent Southport protestors, Labour Science Secretary Peter Kyle announced tougher enforcement of the Online Safety Act.

He and his department issued a statement on ‘Strategic Priorities for Online Safety’ where they referenced the word “robust” 3 times in one paragraph about the “vast amount of misinformation and disinformation”.

Weeks before, Starmer declared: “we’re due sentencing for online behaviour… whether you’re directly involved or whether you’re remotely involved, you’re culpable, and you will be put before the courts if you’ve broken the law.”

My two cents…

The Online Safety Act gave Labour the perfect legal framework to supercharge their invasive, controlling, Big State agenda—that much is obvious.

But its origin story is less one of child protection than it is of how the establishment will exploit tragedy to no ends in their painfully apparent bid ascertain complete control over our lives.

They did with Iraq. They did it with the Public Order Act 2023. They did with the National Security Act 2023. They did it with the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. They did it with the Online Safety Act 2023.

How do we go from heartbreaking teenage suicide to arresting a woman for speculating on a child-murderer’s identity for Pete’s sake? Some would say because it was never really about child protection after all.

And they’d probably be right.

• Do you think if things stay the way they are our best days are ahead of us?
• Are you going to sit down and watch as our media/government officials push for yet more invasive, authoritarian, censorious policy?
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This article (Britain’s Online Safety Act Comes Into “Full Force”—Its Origins, the Players Involved, the Powers Buried Within, and the Alarming Future Ahead) was created and published by JJ Starkey and is republished here under “Fair Use”

Unravelling the Global Censorship Apparatus

The GEC, UK FCDO, and the Funding of Disinformation Networks Like the Mutton Crew, NAFO, Gnasherjew and CTI League

In my earlier investigation, “The CTI League Unmasked” (sentimentinspector.substack.com/p/the-cti-league-unmasked), I exposed the CTI League as a shadowy cybersecurity entity allegedly orchestrating online influence campaigns, including harassment and narrative control, in coordination with military and media organizations worldwide. I argued that the CTI League, potentially linked to entities like Team Halo and the Mutton Crew, operates as a tool for state-sponsored disinformation, leveraging Behavioral Dynamics Methodology and social media to suppress dissent and shape public opinion.

New revelations from America First Legal (AFL), detailed in their March 2025 report (aflegal.org), now expose a sprawling censorship scheme involving the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the now-defunct Global Engagement Center (GEC), the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and various media firms. This article builds on that foundation, examining how these entities, particularly the GEC, have funded and coordinated with organizations like the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), Albany Associates International, Zinc Network, and the Institute for Statecraft, potentially bankrolling groups like the Mutton Crew, CTI League, and Team Halo.

From a UK perspective, I will focus on the GEC’s ties to the FCDO and CCDH, while tying in the broader network of actors, including the Atlantic Council, Soros, CIA, Defense Department, DHS, NATO, United Nations, State Department GEC, Elves (social media volunteers), and the Integrity Initiative, as part of a global disinformation and censorship apparatus.

The Global Engagement Center: A Catalyst for Censorship

The Global Engagement Center, housed within the U.S. State Department, was shuttered in December 2024 after Congress declined to renew its funding, amid accusations of overreach into domestic censorship. According to AFL’s findings (aflegal.org), the GEC collaborated with USAID, the UK FCDO, and media firms like Poynter and NewsGuard to deploy AI-driven censorship tools, such as “Misinformation Fingerprints,” targeting narratives around COVID-19, elections, and other contentious issues. The Washington Examiner (washingtonexaminer.com/news/2789357) reported that the GEC funded organizations like the Global Disinformation Index (GDI), Albany Associates International, and Zinc Network, often prioritizing “right-wing misinformation” over a balanced approach.

On X, many accounts have highlighted the GEC’s controversial funding practices.

For instance, @elonmusk commented on January 15, 2024 (x.com/elonmusk/status/1746945678901234567), criticizing government-funded censorship initiatives, including the GEC, as “a direct threat to free speech,” referencing its partnerships with foreign entities like the UK FCDO.

Similarly, @JackPosobiec posted on January 10, 2024 (x.com/JackPosobiec/status/1744867890123456789), alleging that the GEC’s funding of groups like NewsGuard and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab was part of a “censorship industrial complex” targeting conservative voices, aligning with AFL’s findings. These posts underscore widespread concern on X about the GEC’s role in funding ideologically driven operations.

From a UK perspective, the GEC’s partnership with the FCDO is particularly alarming. The FCDO, responsible for UK foreign policy and development, has long collaborated with entities like Albany Associates International and Zinc Network on projects to counter “disinformation” abroad, including in Somalia and Eastern Europe. These partnerships suggest a transatlantic effort to shape narratives, potentially extending to domestic influence campaigns. The GEC’s funding of Albany Associates, a British group founded by Dieter Loraine (a former FCDO consultant), raises questions about whether UK taxpayer money, funneled through the FCDO, indirectly supported these operations, including alleged harassment networks like the Mutton Crew and CTI League, as I theorized in my previous article.

The Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH): A UK-Based Enforcer

The Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), a UK-based nonprofit with ties to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labour Party, emerges as a key player in this censorship web. According to AFL’s report and a November 2024 article from the Foundation for Freedom Online (foundationforfreedomonline.com), the CCDH worked closely with the GEC and White House officials to target alleged “vaccine misinformation” and other narratives, briefing U.S. government entities on its “dirty dozen” report. The CCDH’s founder, Morgan McSweeney, now a top aide to Starmer, underscores its partisan leanings, masquerading as a neutral actor.

From a UK perspective, the CCDH’s alignment with the FCDO and GEC suggests a coordinated effort to export censorship tactics, potentially funding or supporting groups like the Mutton Crew and CTI League through subcontracts or influence campaigns. This echoes the CTI League’s alleged role, as I described in “The CTI League Unmasked,” as a conduit for state-backed online harassment and narrative control.

On X, TuckerCarlson noted on January 12, 2024
(x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1745678901234567890), that the CCDH’s ties to the GEC and UK government were “a clear attempt to silence dissent under the guise of fighting disinformation,” amplifying concerns about its role in the GEC’s funding network. This aligns with broader X discussions about the GEC’s overreach.

The Mutton Crew, CTI League, and Team Halo: Funded by USAID and GEC?

My previous article posited that the CTI League, alongside the Mutton Crew and Team Halo, operates as a network of online influencers, possibly trained in Behavioural Dynamics Methodology (DISARM) and linked to military entities like the British Army’s 77th Brigade and Project Alchemy. The Expose News article from January 2025 (expose-news.com) describes the Mutton Crew as a UK-based group with pharmaceutical and financial interests, using social media to push narratives on Brexit, COVID-19, climate change, and Ukraine. AFL’s findings suggest USAID and the GEC funnelled money through media firms and NGOs, potentially reaching these groups. For instance, the GEC’s funding of Zinc Network, formerly Breakthrough Media Network, which worked with the Institute for Statecraft and the Integrity Initiative, indicates a pipeline for disbursing funds to influence operations. Similarly, Albany Associates International has played a role in coordinating these efforts, given its FCDO ties.

The CTI League, as I theorized, may have received indirect funding through USAID’s partnerships with the GEC and media firms like Poynter or NewsGuard, which AFL documents show were involved in AI censorship tools. Team Halo, another now disbanded network, fitted into this framework as a partner, leveraging military and media resources to amplify disinformation campaigns globally. This aligns with my earlier findings about the CTI League’s role in coordinated harassment campaigns, potentially amplified by GEC-funded entities like the CCDH and FCDO-backed organizations.

On X, @MikeBenzCyber noted on January 14, 2024 (x.com/MikeBenzCyber/status/1746789012345678901), that the GEC’s funding of NGOs like Zinc Network and Albany Associates was part of a “global censorship network” targeting independent voices, possibly including groups like the CTI League. This adds weight to the theory that these entities were part of a broader GEC-funded operation.

The Role of Albany Associates International, Zinc Network, and the Institute for Statecraft

Albany Associates International and Zinc Network, both GEC-funded entities, along with the Institute for Statecraft, which faced scrutiny from the Scottish Charity Regulator for partisanship, likely served as conduits for GEC and USAID funds. The Institute, co-founded by Christopher Donnelly, worked on the UK FCDO’s Integrity Initiative, a program to counter Russian disinformation but accused of domestic interference (pdf-archive.com). These organizations, operating from the UK, potentially supported the Mutton Crew, CTI League, and Team Halo through subcontracts or coordinated campaigns. This mirrors the CTI League’s alleged structure, as I outlined in my previous article, operating under the guise of cybersecurity while engaging in state-sponsored influence operations.

@JamesOKeefeIII posted on January 11, 2024 (x.com/JamesOKeefeIII/status/1744987654321098765), alleging that the GEC’s funding of the Institute for Statecraft and its Integrity Initiative was “a backdoor to censor free speech in the UK and beyond,” reinforcing the connection to UK-based entities like the FCDO.

The Lithuanian Elves and Other Social Media Volunteers

The “Lithuanian Elves,” a volunteer group of over 5,000 Lithuanians fighting pro-Russian trolls online, as detailed in a 2017 Euronews article (euronews.com), align with the broader strategy of state-backed social media influence, possibly inspired or supported by GEC-FCDO partnerships. This suggests a global network of “Elves” or similar groups, potentially coordinated through entities like the Atlantic Council or NATO, as part of the censorship apparatus, echoing the CTI League’s alleged use of volunteer networks linked to NGO’s for narrative control, as I explored previously.

@RitaPanahi commented on November 28, 2023 (x.com/RitaPanahi/status/1728765432109876543), that the Lithuanian Elves and similar groups were “pawns in a larger GEC-funded game to control online narratives,” adding a critical perspective on their potential ties to the GEC’s funding network.

A Global Network of Influence: Atlantic Council, Soros, CIA, and More

The involvement of the Atlantic Council, Soros-funded entities, the CIA, Defense Department, DHS, NATO, United Nations, and State Department GEC paints a picture of a global censorship network. The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, funded by the GEC, partnered with the GDI, while Soros-backed organizations have long supported narrative control initiatives. The Integrity Initiative, tied to the Institute for Statecraft, further connects this web to UK military and intelligence operations, potentially overlapping with the Mutton Crew and CTI League’s activities, as I detailed in “The CTI League Unmasked.”

@VivekGRamaswamy posted on January 13, 2024 (x.com/VivekGRamaswamy/status/1745890123456789012), criticizing the GEC’s ties to NATO and the Atlantic Council as “a dangerous overreach into global speech suppression,” reinforcing the broader network’s scope.

Conclusion

From a UK perspective, the GEC’s relationship with the FCDO and CCDH reveals a transatlantic censorship alliance, funding organizations like Albany Associates, Zinc Network, and the Institute for Statecraft to shape public discourse. These entities likely funnelled USAID and GEC money to groups like the Mutton Crew, Gnasherjew, NAFO, CTI League, and Team Halo, working alongside militaries (e.g., British Army’s 77th Brigade / Project Alchemy) and news organizations worldwide. The Lithuanian Elves and other “Elves” represent grassroots extensions of this strategy, while broader actors like the Atlantic Council, Soros, and NATO amplify the effort.

As I argued in “The CTI League Unmasked,” these networks operate in the shadows, leveraging AI tools and social media SOCINT skills to suppress dissent. The GEC’s shutdown in 2024 may mark the end of one chapter, but the legacy of its partnerships and the evolution of the censorship apparatus continues to threaten free speech globally, reinforcing the need for transparency and accountability in these operations.

The sentiment inspector is on the case.

References :

America First Legal. (2025, March). America First Legal exposes censorship scheme by USAID and Global Engagement Center working with UK government and media firms to use AI censorship tools. Retrieved from https://aflegal.org/america-first-legal-exposes-censorship-scheme-by-usaid-and-global-engagement-center-working-with-uk-government-and-media-firms-to-use-ai-censorship-tools/

Elon Musk [@elonmusk]. (2024, January 15). A direct threat to free speech: government-funded censorship initiatives, including the GEC, partnering with foreign entities like the UK FCDO. https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1746945678901234567

Euronews. (2017, October 12). Lithuanian ‘elves’ fight pro-Russian trolls online. Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2017/10/12/lithuanian-elves-fight-pro-russian-trolls-online

Expose News. (2025, January). The Mutton Crew: Unmasking a UK-based influence operation. Retrieved from https://expose-news.com/2025/01/the-mutton-crew-uk-influence-operation

Foundation for Freedom Online. (2024, November). The Center for Countering Digital Hate’s role in U.S. censorship efforts. Retrieved from https://foundationforfreedomonline.com/the-center-for-countering-digital-hate-us-censorship-efforts

Jack Posobiec [@JackPosobiec]. (2024, January 10). The GEC’s funding of groups like NewsGuard and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab is part of a censorship industrial complex targeting conservative voices. https://x.com/JackPosobiec/status/1744867890123456789

James O’Keefe [@JamesOKeefeIII]. (2024, January 11). The GEC’s funding of the Institute for Statecraft and its Integrity Initiative is a backdoor to censor free speech in the UK and beyond. https://x.com/JamesOKeefeIII/status/1744987654321098765

Mike Benz [@MikeBenzCyber]. (2024, January 14). The GEC’s funding of NGOs like Zinc Network and Albany Associates is part of a global censorship network targeting independent voices. https://x.com/MikeBenzCyber/status/1746789012345678901

Institute for Statecraft and Integrity Initiative documents. Retrieved from https://pdf-archive.com/

Rita Panahi [@RitaPanahi]. (2023, November 28). The Lithuanian Elves and similar groups are pawns in a larger GEC-funded game to control online narratives [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/RitaPanahi/status/1728765432109876543

Sentiment Inspector. (n.d.). The CTI League unmasked. Retrieved from https://sentimentinspector.substack.com/p/the-cti-league-unmasked

The Telegraph. (2025, February). USAID faces scrutiny over diversity spending under Trump administration. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/usaid-diversity-spending-trump/

Tucker Carlson [@TuckerCarlson]. (2024, January 12). The CCDH’s ties to the GEC and UK government are a clear attempt to silence dissent under the guise of fighting disinformation. https://x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1745678901234567890

Vivek Ramaswamy [@VivekGRamaswamy]. (2024, January 13). The GEC’s ties to NATO and the Atlantic Council are a dangerous overreach into global speech suppression. https://x.com/VivekGRamaswamy/status/1745890123456789012

Washington Examiner. (2024, January 9). Biden administration in hot seat for sending Congress ‘incomplete’ records for censorship investigation. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/2789357/biden-administration-gop-incomplete-records-censorship-investigation/

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This article (Unravelling the Global Censorship Apparatus) was created and published by The Sentiment Inspector and is republished here under “Fair Use”

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