Legislation Watch – The Crime and Policing Bill

The Crime and Policing Bill 2025 was introduced in the House of Commons on 25^th February 2025. You can find the bill here as well as related briefing documents and impact assessments.

The bill introduces several significant measures, allegedly, (and widely promoted as), aimed at ‘enhancing public safety and modernising law enforcement practices’. However, buried within its clauses are several provisions that pose a grave threat to fundamental civil liberties, particularly the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and privacy. The bill’s broad expansion of police powers and the erosion of protections against arbitrary policing have the potential to chill protest activities, infringe upon personal freedoms, and create opportunities for systemic abuse by law enforcement. There is significant scope for nefarious use of the law, grave impacts on human rights, and a dangerous march towards further excessive government and police overreach.

Here are just a few of the bill’s key provisions:

• Enhanced Police Powers: Police officers granted the authority to search properties without a court warrant when recovering stolen, electronically trackable items such as phones and computers
• Use of Technology in Crime Fighting: Law enforcement authorised to conduct searches based on information from “find my phone” apps and Bluetooth technology
• Reporting Obligations for Housing Providers: Housing providers mandated to report specified anti-social data to the Home Office, including details on the use of ASB powers and the frequency of ASB Case Reviews

• Driving Licence Data Access: Police granted access to personal data from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), including names, addresses, dates of birth, and facial images of all licensed drivers. Over 50 million UK citizens hold full or provisional driving licences
• Expansion of Stop and Search Powers: Broader grounds under which police can conduct stop and search operations, including suspicionless searches for individuals carrying items ‘intended’ for use in protest-related offences

In this article I am focusing on just four provisions in the bill. I could have focused on more, but this article is already long enough with what I have picked. However, given my narrow focus, please note that there could be many more problem areas with this bill than what I cover below. Please also note that I have compiled this article by specific reference to the research briefing document associated with the bill – which you can find here – so my numbering reflects that used in the briefing document itself.

Four areas of concern:

11.2 Crime and Policing Bill 2024-25 – Concealing Identity at Protests

This part of the bill presents several potential risks of nefarious or wrong use. The provision’s definition of ‘concealing identity’ is broad and could lead to wide and arbitrary interpretations of what constitutes an offence. Below are some key concerns about this aspect.

1. Vague and Broad Definition

Clause 86 creates an offence of “wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals someone’s identity or another person’s identity in a designated space”. The offence would carry a maximum penalty of one month imprisonment and a £1,000 fine.

This provision does not specify what ‘concealing identity’ means, hence the definition is notably broad and lacks clarity. Further, intention has been stripped away from the offence as a person does not need to intend to conceal their identity to fall foul of the Clause—only have an item that does or can conceal it. This could lead to wide and arbitrary interpretations of what constitutes an offence. A placard accidentally held too close to the face could technically fall within scope, even though it’s not meant to hide someone’s identity, but rather to convey a message.

Police officers will no doubt have leeway to interpret this clause broadly, targeting individuals who are not looking to engage in illegal activity, but simply wishing to express themselves at a protest. The associated risk is that the law could be applied to people wishing to hold up protest signs, wear hats, or use other common protest materials not inherently intended to conceal identities, but that will end up being viewed as such under this provision.

2. Arbitrary Designation of Protest Areas – designated space

The bill gives significant discretion to police officers, especially those of inspector rank or above, to designate protest areas where identity concealment is prohibited. The designation is based on the officer’s belief that a protest is likely to occur and that offences are likely to be committed. The area can be designated for up to 24 hours, with extensions if necessary. This broad discretionary power to designate an area and criminalise identity concealment in that area, based on belief only, might be used to target certain groups of people or movements, suppressing protests before they even begin. This could disproportionately affect those engaging in peaceful protests against government policies, human rights abuses, or other social/political issues.

3. Lack of Specificity Around the Identity Concealment Item

The bill does not specify what items are to be regarded as those being used to conceal someone’s identity. It only specifies that an item “could conceal.” This means a wide range of items beyond face coverings could be interpreted as falling with the offence of Clause 86, such as placards, masks, scarves, banners held close to the face, hooded clothing, large sunglasses, face paint, helmets, signs, and wigs and hair coverings. Given this, the provision could be used to target specific groups or individuals whose protests are viewed as inconvenient or undesirable. If protestors are seen as obstructing or disrupting business as usual, the police could expand this clause to apply to items that are integral to the act of protesting, such as placards and certain forms of dress, effectively criminalising non-violent forms of expression.

4. Impact on Protest Rights and Freedom of Expression

The provisions noted above will severely hinder individuals’ right to protest and their ability to express dissent freely. The fear of arrest, fines, or imprisonment for having a wide range of items beyond face coverings at a protest, such as placards and signs, will discourage individuals from protest participation. Further, those with no intention of identity concealment could commit an offence, merely for wearing a hoodie and sunglasses. This will create a chilling effect on free speech and peaceful assembly and criminalise expression of dissent on crucial social and government issues. This provision may also be weaponised to suppress certain voices, particularly those engaged in contentious or controversial protests.

5. Over-policing and Arbitrary Policing Practices

The proposed provision could also lead to arbitrary policing practices, where individuals are randomly targeted or harassed based on their participation in a particular type of protest, rather than any unlawful actions they may have taken. As the bill doesn’t require clear evidence of intent, people could be penalised simply for the presence of certain items such as scarves or large hats, without any intention of trying to conceal their indentity. The absence of clear and objective criteria for enforcement will lead to over-policing, especially in areas where protests are likely to be seen as a threat to public order or government policies. The risk here is that this provision could empower police to arrest or fine individuals based on arbitrary decisions, creating a form of policing that targets political or social movements without clear justification.

Summary of Potential Issues with 11.2

• Chilling effect on free speech: By criminalising the act of identity concealment without intention during protests, individuals will be deterred from participating in protests, especially those people whose identity or safety might require them to conceal themselves.
• Broad police discretion: The vague language and the broad powers granted to police officers create potential for police to target protestors without any clear evidence of wrongdoing. The discretionary powers granted could therefore lead to targeted repression of specific groups or causes.
• Unclear enforcement criteria: The bill does not clearly define the items that might be considered as concealing one’s identity, leaving too much room for interpretation. This could lead to arbitrary enforcement, with people being penalised for wide ranging items like placards, scarves, hats, face paint or sunglasses, not intended to conceal identity, but falling foul of the bill’s provisions.
• Impact on protest movements: The fear of arrest, imprisonment, or a fine arising from the unclear enforcement criteria will discourage individuals from taking part in protests, effectively stifling political and social movements that challenge the status quo, especially those that address issues such as government and corporate corruption.

12.1 Crime and Policing Bill 2024-25: Police Powers – Power of Entry & Stolen goods

The Bill also proposes an authorisation mechanism for warrantless entry, search, and seizure of items based on electronic tracking of stolen goods, which raises several concerns about such powers being used nefariously and leading to widespread miscarriages of justice, as well as infringing on innocent people’s liberties.

The bill proposes to allow police officers warrantless entry in circumstances where the police have access to electronic tracking data that indicates a stolen item is on, or has been on, a specified premises. In addition, a new section 26B of the Theft Act under the bill would allow a constable powers under a section 26A authorisation to seize any item on specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item under the terms of the authorisation), provided they have reasonable grounds to believe that the said item is stolen goods or evidence in relation to an offence of theft, and that it is necessary to seize the same in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed. The explanatory notes state that this would mean, for example, “if the police enter a property to search for one particular stolen phone but find during their search several other phones they reasonably believe to be stolen and that if not seized, they will be moved off the premises and lost, those phones can also be seized”

1. Broad Use of “Reasonable Belief” Instead of “Reasonable Suspicion”

One of the key elements of these powers is that they are triggered by “reasonable belief,” as opposed to a stricter “reasonable suspicion” standard. This lower threshold gives police officers more discretion to act without a high level of evidence. The broad nature of “reasonable belief” opens the possibility for subjective or biased decision-making by police officers. It could lead to officers acting on hunches, assumptions, or unreliable information, potentially justifying unwarranted seizures. This could disproportionately affect certain groups of people, such as those from marginalised communities, who may be more likely to be targeted based on prejudiced views or profiling. Without the higher standard of “reasonable suspicion,” individuals could face intrusive searches AND seizures based on flimsy or inaccurate grounds.

2. Warrantless Entry and Search Based on Electronic Tracking Data

The power for police to enter premises without a warrant—based solely on electronic tracking data showing that a stolen item has been on the premises—represents a significant erosion of individuals’ property rights and privacy. The conditions for entry, (such as the officer’s belief that a warrant could not be obtained without prejudicing the investigation), give the police a large amount of discretion. This could lead to arbitrary searches, especially if tracking data is mistaken or incomplete. The concept of “electronic tracking” is no doubt flawed, and in addition there might be instances where data is misinterpreted, leading officers to believe that stolen goods are on a premises when, in fact, they are not. Additionally, if there is a reliance on data that is incorrect or does not provide full context, (e.g., if the goods were only temporarily on the premises), people could be subjected to unwarranted searches and seizures of personal property. The lack of oversight in these situations opens the possibility for overreach and invasion of privacy.

3. Electronic Tracking of Items and Potential for Mistakes

The use of electronic tracking poses a significant risk of mistaken identity or mistaken locations, leading to false accusations and/or unjustified police actions. Electronic tracking systems are not infallible, and there is room for error. For example, tracking data could indicate that an item has been in a particular location, but it could be out of date or inaccurate, possibly due to glitches in the tracking system itself. The technology may also be misused or misinterpreted, leading police to enter a property based on false or misleading information. Items may have been moved from the location before the police act on the tracking data, and this delay could result in the search of an innocent person’s premises, with significant disruption and potential for seizure of personal belongings that have no connection to criminal activity.

If the data on electronic tracking is mistaken, individuals could face wrongful searches, invasions of their property, and loss of personal items, even if they are not involved in any criminal activity. This could lead to widespread miscarriages of justice, especially if the tracking system is flawed or if the police mistakenly associate an item with stolen goods, when it belongs to the person whose premises are being searched.

4. Seizure of Items Not Specified in the Search Authorisation

As noted above, under the proposed new powers, police officers will be allowed to seize items that are not part of the original authorisation, provided that they have “reasonable grounds” to believe that they are stolen goods or evidence of theft. This provision gives police significant leeway to seize property that may not even be related to any suspected crime and could result in the unnecessary confiscation of personal belongings from innocent individuals, especially in situations where the line between what is “reasonable” and “unreasonable” is unclear. It could also mean that, even if a person’s premises are being searched for one specific stolen item, (such as a phone), police could seize a wide range of items they deem to be suspicious, potentially including personal property unrelated to the investigation at hand. This seizure of unrelated property infringes on an individual’s right to that property, particularly if the items are not returned or if there is no clear process for challenging the seizure. The risk here is that people could have their property taken without proper justification, leading to unnecessary hardship, the potential for loss of personal items, and damage to individuals’ lives.

5. Impact on Innocent People

The combination of these powers—particularly the use of tracking data, warrantless entry, and broad seizure of items—creates a significant risk of violating the rights of innocent people. For instance, someone could have their home entered and searched simply because a tracked stolen item was mistakenly recorded as having been at their location, a visitor had a stolen item at their property but does not live there, or because an officer has “reasonable belief” that the item is present, even without solid proof. This will no doubt lead to arbitrary policing where individuals are targeted based on wide ranging and wide changing assumptions rather than concrete evidence, meaning people could be deprived of their liberty or subjected to invasive searches for no valid reason. This undermines due process and the presumption of innocence, as people could be treated as suspects based on incomplete or flawed information.

Beyond the practical effects of having property seized or being subjected to searches, there could be a significant psychological and social impact. The fear of being subject to unwarranted searches or property seizures will no doubt lead to a widespread sense of insecurity, distrust in law enforcement, and a broader erosion of civil liberties. Individuals might feel less free to go about their daily lives, particularly if they are constantly worried about being falsely targeted.

Summary of Potential Issues with 12.1:

• Subjective enforcement: The “reasonable belief” standard may lead to arbitrary or biased decision-making, resulting in the disproportionate targeting of certain individuals or communities.
• Electronic tracking mistakes: The reliance on electronic tracking data to justify searches and seizures introduces the risk of incorrect or out-of-date data leading to wrongful actions by the police.
• Seizure of unrelated items: The ability of police to seize property that is not part of the original search authorisation opens the door for abuse and unnecessary confiscation of innocent people’s belongings.
• Infringement of civil liberties: Warrantless searches and the potential for wide-reaching seizures infringe upon an individual rights to privacy, property, and freedom, especially when applied in an overly broad or flawed manner.
• Miscarriage of justice: These provisions create ample room for mistakes, leading to wrongful searches, seizures, and potential harm to innocent people who are caught up in the process due to misunderstandings, misinterpretations and/or technological errors.

12.2 Crime and Policing Bill 2024-25: Police Powers – Driver Licence Records

The proposal in the bill to allow police and law enforcement agencies to access driver licensing records from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), including personal details and images of licensed drivers, has raised alarms about potential privacy violations, the creation of extensive facial recognition databases, human rights violations, and the potential for further and future overreach through the use of secondary legislation.

Clause 95 of the bill allows the Secretary of State to make regulations (secondary legislation), to enable police and law enforcement agencies to access driver licensing records held by the DVLA. This would apply across the UK.

The Conservative government sought to widen access to DVLA records through a clause in their failed Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24. In public bill committee, the then Labour opposition expressed concern that the government intended to issue secondary legislation to expand the circumstances under which the police could access DVLA records. Alex Norris MP, then shadow policing minister, stated: “The police have access to DVLA information in relation to a very narrow set of offences, but the clause is essentially saying that the information is fair play for enforcement agencies, subject to whatever regulations a Secretary of State may set in the future. That is an egregious use of Henry VIII powers. If the Government have a regime in mind, they should say what it is. Instead, we are possibly giving over the entire DVLA database to the Secretary of State, and it is currently not clear what it will be used for”

Responding to the proposed powers, Madeleine Stone, Senior Advocacy Officer at Big Brother Watch said:

“It’s disturbing to see the Government is reheating the Conservative’s abandoned plans to grant all police forces access to our driving licence photos, opening the door to the creation of a massive facial recognition database.

“More than 50 million Britons hold driving licences in order to travel and have not given permission for the Government to turn our photos into mugshots. The Bill allows the Government to grant police officers extraordinary powers to identify and track anyone with a driving licence, at the click of a button. Not only would this be an unprecedented breach of privacy but would also put innocent citizens at risk of misidentifications and injustice.

“The Conservative Government attempted to introduce these powers in the Criminal Justice Bill, leading to public backlash. Then-Policing Minster Chris Philp stated that the powers “allow police and law enforcement, including the NCA, to access driving licence records to do a facial recognition search, which, anomalously, is currently quite difficult.”

Below, I highlight some further key concerns.

1. Expansion of Executive Power

Despite Alex Norris’ comments, the Labour government now seek to revive the failed DVLA access powers under the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 with Clause 95 providing a broad scope for the Secretary of State to make regulations that could alter or extend the uses of DVLA data, specifically allowing an “authorised person” to access this information. Such regulations could be set without much parliamentary oversight and allow the Secretary of State significant flexibility to define or expand the purposes and scope of who can access DVLA data and for what reasons, without the need for full parliamentary scrutiny. The wide-ranging extent of such regulations could potentially mean they are used to expand the availability of personal data to entities or individuals outside of law enforcement, or for purposes beyond what was originally intended.

The lack of transparent checks and balances in the creation of such regulations could result in the wide overreach of executive power as the public and Parliament alike will not have full visibility or input into how this power is exercised by the Secretary of State. This could very well create an environment where data might be used for more invasive or inappropriate purposes than the public originally consented to. Particularly, the police could use expanded access to DVLA records in combination with live facial recognition, without any strong safeguards.

2. Access to Personal Data without Explicit Consent

Individuals of course provide sensitive driver licencing records to DVLA when they apply for or renew their driver’s licences, with the understanding that it will only be used for the purpose of vehicle regulation, road safety, and driving qualifications. Access to this data by the police or other agencies will therefore occur without an individual’s direct consent. This raises significant data privacy concerns, as individuals did not sign up for their personal information to be routinely accessed by law enforcement, especially for reasons that may not directly relate to their driving record. Access to this data could be abused, and without stringent safeguards in place there is the risk that personal data might be used for broader surveillance purposes, rather than being limited to its original intended use. Individuals will no doubt NOT have expected their data to be shared with agencies such as the Ministry of Defence Police when providing their information to DVLA – and moves to allow this represent a clear breach of trust between the public and the state. Moreover, if driving licence data is accessed for purposes beyond policing, such as surveillance or intelligence gathering, it will represent a serious violation of privacy and human rights.

3. Possible Expansion of Access to Non-Law Enforcement Entities

The bill broadens the list of bodies that can access DVLA data by including non-territorial police forces – e.g., the Ministry of Defence Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), amongst others. This raises the question of who else may be able to access the data in the future and what those entities might do with it, as the inclusion of non-territorial and crown dependency police forces—such as military police—creates a widening circle of access to personal data which could be used for purposes beyond what most individuals would expect. Additionally, members of the military police or other non-civilian entities may not be held to the same standards of oversight and accountability as civilian police forces and this increases the risk of overreach or abuse of the data for purposes unrelated to crime prevention or law enforcement, infringing upon the rights of individuals to keep their personal information confidential.

4. Data Use Beyond Law Enforcement

The regulations governing the use of DVLA data could lead to mission creep—where data that was initially collected for a specific, legitimate purpose, (e.g., for driver licensing), could be used for other purposes without explicit consent. For example, the use of driver data for purposes like surveillance or facial recognition for monitoring protestors, or even for private sector uses like marketing or financial profiling, could be justified under broad interpretations of law enforcement needs.

The risk here is wide misuse and human rights violations. If sufficient restrictions are not put in place, there could be a blurring of lines between legitimate law enforcement activities and broader surveillance practices. This could infringe on citizens’ freedom of movement and right to privacy, both of which are protected under human rights frameworks such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Citizens have a reasonable expectation that their personal data—especially when it pertains to something as private as their driver’s licence—will not be used for surveillance, monitoring, or other intrusive purposes unrelated to their original consent.

5. Human Rights Concerns and Breach of Consent

In the context of data privacy, individuals have a right to control the use of their personal data, and any access to it by authorities should be subject to strict legal protections. This includes clear consent from individuals about who can access their data and under what circumstances. The broad access provisions in Clause 95 raise significant human rights concerns, particularly regarding the right to privacy and freedom from arbitrary interference with personal information.

Particularly, Clause 95 could be seen as a breach of the right to privacy as protected under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. If DVLA records are accessed without sufficient legal safeguards, it could be considered a disproportionate interference with individuals’ private lives, especially as no explicit consent for the data to be accessed by a wide range of authorities must be given by an individual. Moreover, the right to informational self-determination could be undermined, as individuals may not be aware of, or have control over, how their data is being used.

6. Potential for Overreach and Abuse of Power

While the bill stipulates that the Secretary of State must consult relevant bodies before making regulations, the broad and flexible nature of this provision still leaves room for misuse and abuse of power. If the regulations become too permissive or vague about how data can be accessed and used, it could lead to increased surveillance or targeting of individuals without proper oversight.

The lack of clear, defined boundaries for how and when such data can be accessed and used presents a risk that these powers will be misused by law enforcement agencies or other actors. The ability to access data without clear limitations could be used for political targeting or profiling, especially in sensitive situations like protests, public demonstrations, or other forms of dissent. This will amount to a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as individuals could be monitored without their consent or knowledge.

Summary of Potential Issues with 12.2:

• Overreach through Statutory Instruments: The Secretary of State’s ability to make regulations without full parliamentary oversight could lead to broad or unclear rules that extend sharing sensitive driver data beyond what was originally intended for law enforcement, risking potential misuse.
• Breach of Data Privacy: The blanket access to DVLA records, without explicit consent from individuals, likely infringes on personal privacy and data protection rights, and could result in the misuse of sensitive information.
• Human Rights Violations: The potential for broad access to personal data could violate individuals’ rights to privacy and freedom from arbitrary interference in their private lives, which are fundamental human rights protections.
• Misuse by Non-Law Enforcement Entities: The inclusion of non-territorial and crown dependency police forces could lead to misuse of data by entities that may not be held to the same transparency and accountability standards as civilian law enforcement.
• Surveillance and Data Misuse: If DVLA records are used for surveillance or broader purposes not directly related to crime prevention, this could result in mission creep and intrusive monitoring of individuals without their knowledge or consent.

15.3 Crime and Policing Bill 2024-25: Other measures – Terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures:

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 currently allow the Home Secretary to impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures on an individual believed to be involved in terrorism, where prosecution is not feasible. The National Security Act 2023 contains an equivalent power applicable to those believed to be involved in ‘foreign power threat activity’. One of the measures that can be imposed under both pieces of legislation is a prohibition on possessing offensive weapons, defined as “an article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person in possession of it for such use, (by that person or another)”. Clause 122 of this bill seeks to expand that definition to include corrosive substances and motor vehicles.

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 currently makes it an offence to wear clothing or carry or display articles in public in such a way or in such circumstances as arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. Clause 123 of this bill seeks to amend the associated seizure power to this, to permit police to seize an article to prevent its ongoing display in public. The explanatory notes say that the intention of the amendment is to enable the police to seize an article even without an investigation into a possible offence. This proposed amendment could therefore have significant implications for free expression, privacy, and journalistic independence, particularly in the context of politically sensitive or controversial issues and may have significant potential for misuse.

1. Vague Definitions of Offensive Weapons and Intended Use

Clause 122 extends the definition of offensive weapons to include corrosive substances and motor vehicles. However, the definitions of offensive weapons linked to their intended use, as contained in existing legislation, are already vague. The phrase “articles intended for use for causing injury” or “for such use by that person or another” are broad, meaning a risk of subjective interpretation where motor vehicles are concerned. Given that terrorism prevention and investigation measures can be imposed on individuals for a mere belief in their terrorism involvement, individuals could wrongly see their motor vehicles seized and destroyed as a result. We should also remember that there is already an ongoing push to designate misinformation, disinformation and malinformation as terrorist offences, which if successful could see many individuals somehow classed as linked to proscribed organisations and therefore at risk of losing their motor vehicle.

Given the subjective nature of terror related definitions that already exist in legislation, there is scope in this bill for further political targeting. Organisations that challenge state policies or engage in resistance movements—such as Palestinian advocacy groups or other politically motivated organisations—could face the risk of being linked to proscribed organisations, even if their activities are peaceful or non-violent. Even those reporting on such groups could face legal consequences and may fall within the scope of Clause 122 where offensive weapons are concerned.

2. Expansion of Powers for Seizure and Destruction of Materials

Use of increased powers to seize and destroy items associated with individuals who are suspected of supporting proscribed organisations is not contingent on a full investigation into a specific offence or an individual being charged with an offence and appearing in Court to have their case heard. Instead, the power is to be wielded as a result of reasonable suspicion or in situations where articles are found, such as flags or posters, that may “arouse suspicion” that the individual supports a proscribed organisation.

The ability to seize and destroy material without an investigation or established evidence of wrongdoing opens the door for abuse of power. For instance, a journalist or activist could be at risk if they are in possession of materials, such as posters, flags, or literature, that are deemed to be associated with a proscribed organisation, even if they are merely reporting on, or documenting an issue. This could be particularly problematic in cases where the organisation in question is controversial or subject to shifting political views. Journalists covering politically sensitive topics—such as Palestinian issues, foreign conflicts such as Ukraine/Russia, or political protests—may find themselves targeted and accused of supporting a proscribed organisation for simply reporting on its activities. Images, flags, or other materials used in such journalism could be seized and destroyed, hindering the ability to report on key issues. This would infringe on freedom of the press and could have a chilling effect, making journalists less likely to report on topics that might invite scrutiny or accusations of supporting terrorist groups. This would in turn result in censorship which restricts the public’s access to important news, especially on controversial or sensitive topics.

3. Censorship of Political Expression

An enlarged power to seize and destroy material associated with proscribed organisations could also have a chilling effect on political expression more broadly. Political movements and individuals advocating for causes that may be controversial—like Palestinian sovereignty, Russian/Ukraine issues, or Syrian issues—could find themselves subjected to measures under this bill.

The potential for seizing and destroying items related to political movements could disproportionately target protestors, activists, and individuals involved in dissenting movements. Protest materials, whether a flag, a banner, or even specific slogans, could be viewed as supporting a proscribed group, leading to legal consequences for individuals engaging in peaceful protest. This could create a climate of fear, where people feel their freedom to protest or express political opinions is curtailed by the possibility of their possessions being seized or destroyed.

The ability to seize and destroy items without a clear investigation or specific evidence of a crime leaves these powers vulnerable to abuse. Without careful oversight, these powers could be used as a tool for political repression or ideological control, targeting individuals or organisations based on their political views rather than actual criminal behaviour, and the absence of a clear requirement for investigations or evidence of a crime means that there could be instances where materials are seized arbitrarily based on the political views of the person in possession. This undermines due process and gives authorities excessive discretion to target individuals or groups whose views do not align with those of government.

Summary of Potential Issues with 15.3:

• Vague Definitions and Expanded Powers: The expansion of the definition of offensive weapons to include motor vehicles could lead to subjective interpretations which allows for the seizure of vehicles linked to terrorism without clear evidence of the same, potentially leading to wrongful confiscation
• Expansion of Powers for Seizure and Destruction: Allowing police to seize and destroy materials, like flags, posters, or literature, without requiring a full investigation or proof of a specific criminal offence opens the door to abuse, particularly for journalists or activists who might be accused of supporting proscribed organisations for merely reporting or documenting activities
• Impact on Press Freedom and Chilling Effect: Broad powers to seize materials without clear evidence could lead to censorship of political expression, especially for journalists reporting on politically sensitive or controversial topics, limiting public access to important news and stifling freedom of the press, particularly alternative media
• Targeting of Protestors: Expanded powers could disproportionately affect political movements, activists, and protestors advocating for controversial causes. The seizure and destruction of materials linked to peaceful political movements could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, creating fear that dissenting views may lead to the loss of personal property or legal consequences

Other – New Sentencing Guidelines

You are likely aware that the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines, which are included in the bill, suggest taking into account the ethnic and personal backgrounds of offenders—such as those who belong to minority ethnic or faith groups, are young adults, survivors of abuse, pregnant women, or identify as trans—when deciding whether to imprison someone. However, the guidelines make no mention of white British males, leading many to criticise them as creating a “two-tier system” of justice. This approach has raised concerns about undermining the principle of equal treatment under the law. For more information on this aspect, you can refer to our Telegram post here.

In Conclusion

Estimates indicate that this bill will result in only an additional 13 to 55 imprisonments per year, which raises questions about its effectiveness in addressing crime. This prompts me to ask: “What is the real purpose of this bill?” Critics argue that it functions more as a political gesture than a substantive crime-fighting measure. However, I would like to highlight the possibility that this bill may serve as a troubling power grab, facilitating the expansion of state surveillance and the sharing of personal data without consent.

Let me know what you think, because, as always, I am interested in hearing what others are picking up on with this proposed legislation.

About Legislation Watch: I created Legislation Watch to raise awareness of the Bills (and other legal instruments) currently under consideration in the UK. You can access this link here, which will direct you to a CSV file listing all Bills going through the Commons and Lords. The file indicates the current reading stage of each Bill. While I won’t be covering every Bill and legal instrument— as that would be impractical—my focus will be on those that appear to be state surveillance tools, power grabs, or pose a significant and immediate threat to the UK public. If there’s a specific Bill or legal instrument you’d like me to cover, please feel free to get in touch and let me know.

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This article (Legislation Watch – The Crime and Policing Bill) was created and published by Conscientious Currency and is republished here under “Fair Use”

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