SAM LOWRY
In September 2025, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer introduced a new digital identity scheme for the UK. The Government says it will prevent illegal working and make public services simpler to access. Officials mention convenience, security and inclusion, but they do not explain who will control the system, how it will be used or what people can do if it is misused.
Right now, the digital ID scheme is a large and unnecessary move toward more government surveillance. It follows a pattern of government overreach and could leave older people and those with less money excluded from society. Advertising the scheme on YouTube before the consultation ends also shows a troubling attitude toward democracy, which should worry everyone, no matter their views on digital identity.
A solution Britain has not asked for
The Government claims that proving your identity is complicated and difficult, but this is open to debate. For generations, people in Britain have used passports, National Insurance numbers, driving licences, bank statements and utility bills to prove who they are. This system is intentionally spread out. No single authority controls it, so there is no single point of failure, and no one institution can take away someone’s ability to prove their identity.
The United Kingdom has a distinctive and hard-won tradition of resisting national identity schemes. When wartime identity cards were retained after 1945, the public mood turned sharply against them. In 1951, a motorist named Clarence Willcock refused a police officer’s demand to produce his card. The subsequent court ruling was so emphatic in its defence of individual liberty that the cards were abolished shortly afterwards.
The belief that the state must answer to its citizens, not the other way around, has continued. This led to the cross-party rejection of Tony Blair’s Identity Cards Act, which was repealed in 2010 after strong public opposition. Now, the current Government is trying a similar idea under a new name. The goal remains the same, even if the method has changed.
The architecture of overreach
The Government says digital ID will be voluntary in most situations. But this claim needs a closer look. The scheme will make digital ID mandatory for Right to Work checks by the end of this Parliament. So, anyone who wants to work legally in the UK will have to use it. Calling it ‘voluntary’ is misleading.
What’s even more worrying is what a unified digital identity system could allow, no matter what ministers say now. Once a single digital credential is linked to a person’s phone and used for things like driving licences, benefits, childcare, tax records and a GOV.UK digital wallet, the technology is there to connect even more services in the future. History gives us no reason to feel reassured.
Once created, surveillance systems often expand beyond their original purpose. The UK already has one of the world’s densest networks of CCTV cameras. Data sharing between government departments has steadily increased, with little public debate. The Online Safety Act now requires digital platforms to monitor and report user content to the Government. Each of these changes came with promises to be careful and limited.
There are real risks with a phone-based digital identity. When a credential is stored on a mobile device and used for different services, it creates a detailed record of where someone has been, what services they used and when. If this credential is linked to a digital wallet, as the Government suggests, then information about transactions could also become visible to the state in new ways.
The Government says the system will use selective disclosure, meaning it will only share the information needed for each situation, and that this will improve privacy compared to paper-based systems. This is technically possible. But it does not matter if there is no independent legal framework for data retention, access and oversight. The announcement does not mention these issues.
A Government that has already forfeited trust
The scheme asks people to trust the Government with much more power. But that trust only makes sense if the Government has earned it. The current Government’s record gives people good reasons to be sceptical.
The conviction of Lucy Connolly for a social media post is just one example of the state’s willingness to prosecute people for what they say online, even in unclear legal areas. No matter what you think about that case, the bigger trend is clear: governments have steadily made it harder for people to protest or speak out. Hate speech laws have been broadened and protest rights have been limited by the Public Order Act. The Government is more willing than before to step in when people express opposing views or gather for legal activities that the government disapproves of.
When you combine this willingness to act with a unified digital ID system, something new becomes possible. It’s not just about punishing speech after it happens, but about monitoring, flagging and profiling people in real time based on what they do online. A government that wants to stop dissent does not have to go after everyone. It only needs to make people believe it could.
The chilling effect, when people censor themselves because they know the state is watching, is a form of control, even if actual prosecutions are rare.
The main principle here is simple: a free society should not build systems that could be badly abused just because the government promises not to misuse them. That promise cannot control what future governments, Parliaments, or courts might do.
Britain’s answer to this issue has always been clear: no.
Exclusion dressed as inclusion
The Government says inclusion is central to the scheme. It admits that some people cannot use smartphones and promises in-person help for those who struggle to access the service. These promises are good as far as they go, but they do not go far enough.
Millions of British citizens, especially those who are elderly, disabled, live in rural areas or have low incomes, either do not own smartphones, lack reliable internet access or do not feel confident using these systems even if they have the right devices.
The Government calls this a free scheme, but that is only true if you ignore the real costs of the technology needed to use it. A modern smartphone that can run secure biometric apps, plus a monthly mobile data plan, is a real and ongoing expense. This cost hits hardest for those who can least afford it.
This problem is not new, but digital ID would make it much worse. Moving public services online, such as Universal Credit, tax self-assessment and NHS appointments, has already created a two-tier system. People who can use digital tools get faster, easier service. Those who cannot are left with under-resourced phone lines, long waits and the feeling of being treated as outsiders instead of citizens.
There is a bigger problem the Government has not addressed. If real alternatives to digital ID exist, as promised, then employers, landlords and service providers will keep using them, and the scheme will not stop illegal working. But if digital ID becomes the main way to prove identity, people without it will be at a real disadvantage when seeking jobs, housing or services. There is no easy middle ground, and the Government has not explained how it will handle this.
We should also consider what this scheme asks of the generation that has contributed most to public services. Older people who have paid taxes all their lives are now being told they may need to buy expensive technology and pay for a monthly phone plan just to access what they are entitled to. This is not true modernisation. It puts the costs on individuals, especially those who can least afford it.
Advertising before consent
One of the most revealing parts of this situation is that before the promised public consultation has finished, before Parliament has legislated and before any real democratic mandate has been established, the Government has already started advertising the digital ID scheme on YouTube.
This alone is a problem for democracy. The Government is using public money to promote a policy it claims is still open to public input. The consultation is just for show. The decision has already been made. The ads are meant to get people used to the idea, not to listen to what they think.
Choosing YouTube makes things worse. YouTube is owned by Google, a company known for collecting large amounts of user data. Google’s business depends on tracking what people do, what they like and where they go, then selling that information to advertisers. The Government says digital ID will improve privacy, but it is promoting the scheme on a platform that reduces privacy.
Android, the world’s most popular smartphone operating system, is owned and developed by Google and can track all online activity, including banking, location data, information about nearby devices and other individuals, communication, audio recordings and more. A Government digital ID on an Android device may have access to all of that.
There is another issue. YouTube ads are not just shown to everyone; they are targeted. The Government has already used Google’s profiling tools to aim these ads at certain groups, reaching people most likely to respond or who need reassurance. This means citizens are being targeted based on data a private company already has about them, encouraging them to give the state even more data. This closed surveillance loop should make anyone stop and think.
The ads also help make the scheme seem normal. By the time people organise real opposition, many will already be used to the idea. What once felt strange becomes acceptable, not because of debate, but because people see it repeatedly. That is exactly what advertising is meant to do.
The burden of proof
You do not have to dislike technology or deny that digital ID systems can work well to have these concerns. Estonia shows these systems can succeed. But Estonia’s system is built on real public debate, strong independent oversight and a culture that values data rights. The UK Government’s current proposal does not offer any of these things and has a demonstrable history of harshly punishing its citizens for even the slightest perceived transgression.
So far, the UK Government has given us a press release, a promise of consultation, some international comparisons without context and a taxpayer-funded YouTube ad campaign. What is missing is a strong legal framework for data access and retention, an independent oversight body with real power, a real alternative for people who cannot or choose not to use the technology, and an honest look at how much surveillance this system would allow.
The burden of proof in a matter this important rests entirely with those proposing the scheme. That burden has not been met. Until it is, British citizens have every reason to see the digital ID scheme not as a service offered to them, but as a power being taken over them, and to speak up clearly and without apology before the system is in place and the chance to object is gone.
This article (Britain Doesn’t Want or Need Digital ID) was created and published by The Daily Sceptic and is republished here under “Fair Use” with attribution to the author Sam Lowry
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