British energy policy – not cheap, not home-grown and not secure
SIR DIETER HELM
Some people – and some politicians – seem to believe that if you keep repeating claims eventually they will be believed, even as the evidence unfolds that they are obviously just not true. Any countervailing evidence is merely to be reinterpreted as if it is consistent with the claims, however great the contortions of the truth may need to be. If necessary, then smear those making the counterclaims and if possible cancel them. That’s how paradigms get established, and why they are so dangerously persistent. It takes a lot to overturn a paradigm, especially in energy and climate policy.
This helps to explain the lines that DESNZ keeps trotting out about renewables being much cheaper, that they are more secure because they are home-grown, and that bills will be coming down. In the hands of politicians, this translates into claims like “renewables are nine times cheaper”,[1] £300 will be coming off your bills, and anything to the contrary is “climate vandalism”. All of these claims have been made by the current Secretary of State. It feeds through into sloppy journalism, with the number of homes that the latest wind or solar farm will power copied directly from press releases without any mention of intermittency. Just keep saying it again and again, stick it on all and every press release and government document, rely on those with a vested interest in the public buying it to come to the aid of its proponents.
This is a shared approach across DESNZ, the Climate Change Committee, the National Energy System Operator and OFGEM, reinforced by the “Mission” inside DESNZ.
Making these claims is getting to be very hard-going. The fact of Britain having the highest electricity prices for industrial customers in the developed world is a tough one to reinterpret as evidence of cheap energy. The lazy explanation has been to say it is all the fault of high and volatile gas prices, notwithstanding that they are no longer high nor volatile, with the wholesale price becoming less and less important in determining the final costs and prices. Indeed, gas prices are becoming increasingly irrelevant in determining the costs of energy in Britain.
The key trick in reinterpreting challenging evidence to the contrary is to draw a sharp distinction between the past and the future. The future is yet to reveal itself, so it is always possible to make the claim that it will be the utopia that this paradigm promises. Unfortunately for the believers, that future is increasingly being cemented into place by decisions taken now, and hence for the foreseeable future up to 2040 and even beyond, the government is baking in very high costs. Why? Because it is putting in place contracts that embed these high prices; it is creating a much more fragile system with ever-greater intermittency; it is crystalising a reliance on imported energy (electricity, gas and oil); and the regulator is forced to commit to doubling the size of the grid to deliver the same output of firm power. As a result, not only is the government baking in very costly energy for the next 15–20 years, but it is also protecting customers from any benefits that might come from low and stable gas prices. The irony is profound: you really could not make this up.
Let’s start with the cheap bit
It is now all but impossible to claim that the great “world leadership” on climate change is producing “cheap energy”. What Britain has demonstrated to the world is how to pursue a territorial carbon production target in a way that produces amongst the highest prices in the world. Britain has therefore provided a great example of how not to do it, and no other country will be looking to it to see how to replicate this.
Believers in cheaper power should next ask why the costs and prices are so high. It is not hard to find out. Britain now needs twice the capacity of generation and twice the grid capacity to produce the same output, in addition to a host of batteries, and pumped storage, plus lots and lots of imports. Even by 2030, on the government’s trajectory, 35GW of gas is needed to run 5% of the time.
How could any rational objective person conclude that this is cheap? The answer is the old device: change the question to get the pre-conceived answer you want to get. This goes as follows. Let’s concentrate not on the system costs that determine the price, but on the marginal costs of wind and solar. It’s now easy: the marginal costs are close to zero. Then jump to the conclusion that, since gas has marginal costs, and wind and solar do not, wind and solar are therefore cheaper and the bills are going to come down accordingly.
Add a number of assumptions about “S” curves for new technologies and falling costs of solar panels (though not now wind turbines), and it looks even better.
It is a very “good thing” that the price of a solar panel made in China is coming down, but it makes almost no difference to the system costs of adding more and more intermittent solar onto the system in a country not blessed with the sorts of sunshine experienced in North Africa, the Middle East and the tropics. Lots of solar may indeed be cheaper in the “sun belt”. Sadly, in this respect Britain is not one of these lucky countries.
When it comes to wind, the story is worse. Unlike solar panels, wind turbines are not getting cheaper anymore. Though production costs may be falling in China and elsewhere, the cost of capital is the key variable and the bids in Britain in AR7 are heading north not south. The current AR7 round has brought a sobering reality to the “always getting cheaper” path.
What makes the wind story much worse is the location of the new wind farms. Lots of these are in Scotland, and Scotland does not have much demand for electricity. The electricity produced by these wind farms is surplus to Scottish requirements, so the output needs to be transported south to England. That means more transmission lines. To see how uneconomic it has been to locate all this offshore wind in Scotland, consider the implications. At the moment, that wind is constrained off for up to 40% of the time. It generates between say 40% and 50% of the time and then, when it does, it gets constrained off for up to 40% of the time. During these periods, the electricity is useless. We pay for it, but don’t use it.
Do a little back-of-the-envelope calculation. Offshore Scottish wind requires a contract for differences (CfD) of, say, £110–£120/MWh. Add to this the costs of the extra transmission that is needed specifically for this extra wind, and add in the back-up costs in gas, which are made much more costly because it is mostly on standby. How could this be a sensible economic thing to do? The conclusion is that the wrong capacity is being built in the wrong places because the wind farm developers do not face the full costs of the intermittency they cause and because of their distance from the market.
All this is before the additional environmental costs of building lots and lots of high-voltage transmission lines through some of the most iconic landscapes in Britain.
Perhaps nuclear is getting cheaper? Sadly, not so. It costs more than £10 billion per gigawatt to bring on new nuclear in Britain – perhaps the most expensive new nuclear in the world. The costs of Hinkley and now Sizewell will be with customers for the next 20–30 years or more, and they are not cost-competitive with gas.
Perhaps these are all transitionary, inevitable pains of the transition to net zero? Not so, for the government is doling out contracts that cement in costs to well beyond 2040. It has made it all but inevitable that the future costs of energy in Britain are going to stay high and remain amongst the highest in the developed world. The decisions made today are baking in a future energy system with contracts that fix the prices for decades to come. The government is making it even worse: the offshore CfDs in AR7 now have a 20-year duration, rather than 15 years. Just to state the obvious: this means that the prices struck now by DESNZ will be the prices still prevailing in 2045.
That leaves the fall-back argument for the Secretary of State: however costly it might be, it will be cheaper than relying on gas. Yet even this is not true, for the obvious reason that, far from phasing out gas in the 2030s, Britain is going to need to use a lot of gas, and the amount used may actually be higher than otherwise would have been the case, and because of rapid exit from North Sea gas production, it will increasingly include high-cost, high-polluting liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The gas story has not received the ministerial attention it ought to have done. Instead of simply assuming a phase-out, it would be wise to look at the demand for electricity and the increasing importance of firm power. Though much of it may be exaggerated hype, there can be little doubt that the coming of AI and data centres pushes up the demand for electricity. This demand is critically dependent on firm power, 24/7, which is what wind and solar do not provide. What data centres and AI are looking for in Britain (and in the US and elsewhere) is baseload power, and in the absence of nuclear any time soon, they turn towards self-generation and gas. Elsewhere, so great is the demand for gas to generate electricity for data centres that it is starting to cause difficulties for other electricity users. Texas is the stand-out example. It is beginning to ration off the development of shale gas production for lack of power.
It is very doubtful that the forecasts of doubling of electricity demand in Britain over the next 20–25 years will materialise. The very high prices will dampen this demand growth, and the hype about AI is probably overdone. Nevertheless, the question remains: what will generate the electricity, sufficient to replicate all the existing system? It is unlikely to be solar in Britain, and it is hard to imagine it could be wind. So that leaves nuclear, and Britain is on an exit path from nuclear, to be topped up by Hinkley and Sizewell in due course, joining the only existing nuclear power station likely to be still going in the 2030s: Sizewell B. At best, this gives 7–8GW of nuclear power. Not enough to bridge the gap – more a replacement of what has been closed. SMRs (small modular reactors) might come to the rescue, but not until the end of the 2030s and probably later.
Britain has got out of coal, so that is not an option. All roads therefore lead to gas. Gas is the major energy for heating as well as for supporting electricity. The idea that the electricity system is going to carry all the extra AI and data centres, plus the heating load, and large industrial demands of steel and other energy-intensive industries and do this with wind and solar is an assumption the believers make. They should take a closer look and explain how all this works with a phase-out of gas in the 2030s. It won’t and it probably can’t.
The net result is that, not only does Britain have amongst the highest-cost electricity in the world, but this is being baked in beyond 2040. It will be a big drag on economic growth. Indeed, it already is. Britain is not going to have cheap energy any time soon – unless there is radical policy action.
Let’s turn to the home-grown bit
Locked to the “getting out of gas” argument is the claim that Britain is maximising “home-grown energy”. This is even more absurd than the claim that it is all going to be cheap. It isn’t home-grown, other than to claim that it is our wind and our sunshine. It is as absurd as saying that a car made in China is “home-grown” if it is driven in Britain.
The facts are very different. Let’s take each of the main generation technologies in turn, then the networks and then the batteries.
Starting with nuclear, Sizewell and Hinkley are French reactors. The last attempt at a British nuclear reactor were the ill-fated AGRs (advanced gas-cooled reactors), a technology which Tony Benn chose over the US PWRs (pressurised-water reactors) back in the 1970s and in the face of strong advice from Lord Marshall and the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). To put this choice into perspective, Dungeness B took 22 years to produce a spark.
The French PWRs were initially intended as a German–French project to produce what was called the European PWR. The Germans pulled out, leaving the French to develop the current models. In future, the chances that Britain will develop a nuclear supply chain are reduced by the obvious lack of a programme for the last few decades. The British preference for “let’s try one and see if it works” gives little incentive for companies to invest in nuclear for the long term. The contrast with the French programme of over 50 PWRs is stark.
SMRs might get designed, built and run by Rolls-Royce (RR). RR has deep nuclear technological skills, but no experience of actually building them. Rolling what are, in effect, currently small PWRs off a production line requires large orders, and so far the government is proving reluctant to commit. Instead, it might “try two and see if they work” and then decide whether to order some more. Uranium is not home-mined, though there is fuel fabrication.
If Britain wants home-grown nuclear, it needs urgently to commit to a very large-scale full supply chain programme. Only France, Japan, Russia, China, the US and at the margin Canada have managed this.
In the CEGB days, nuclear projects were largely funded by customers on a pay-as-you-go basis. Now it is foreign finance – directly, or indirectly with foreign financing of the government’s debts – that is called upon, though the switch to a regulatory asset base (RAB) pay-as-you-go model for Sizewell is a step back towards the CEGB model.
What about wind? Britain has the biggest offshore programme for wind. But the British “home-grown” bit is limited to the erection of the wind turbines. Britain does not make many wind turbines, and it does not have the minerals that go into them, notably the rare earths for the magnets.
Even the erection of the wind turbines is not home-grown. Almost all the offshore wind industry is foreign-owned and -financed. All British consumers do is pay mainly to the foreign developers and owners. Ownership and finance are largely for foreigners.
Solar? 80% of the world solar panels are made in China, with a very heavy environmental and social cost. They fall foul of any definition of ESG (environment, social and governance), however weak. There are virtually no solar panels made in Britain. They are not home-grown. And, as with the finance and ownership of wind, much of this is foreign too.
That leaves gas on the generation side. For the last four decades, this has been “made in Britain”. But the British sector of the North Sea is being run down (unlike the Norwegian sector), and the government’s policy is to accelerate this run-down. Already dependent for over 30% of gas from Norway (and its North Sea sector), a faster rundown means more LNG from the US, Qatar and elsewhere. LNG is much more polluting than natural gas by pipeline. It is also prone to the diplomatic pressures of the US. Both the US and Qatar are currently pressing the EU to water down their environmental rules. Britain will probably have to follow.
The upshot of this canter across the generation technologies is that British energy is not home-grown; it is not going to be home-grown any time soon; and the government’s policies are actually exacerbating foreign dependency on minerals, equipment, and finance.
What about the transmission network? Recall that this has to be doubled to support the same output because of the intermittency. Where is all the cable going to come from? Britain is rapidly running down its steel industry (ironically, exacerbated by high energy costs), and it has virtually no copper. It does not make transformers at scale. The upshot is that almost all of the supply chain is imported, with only some manufacture of cables from their foreign components in Britain. The transmission network is not going to be home-grown.
Batteries? Britain has little lithium (a bit in Cornwall) and no significant refineries for lithium. It has no nickel, copper or cobalt, and no refineries for these either. Manufacture is largely an overseas activity, with China in the lead again (as it is for refining the key minerals and providing the rare earths). So batteries are not home-grown.
Let’s turn to security of supply
Security of supply is one of those terms that is more a slogan than a clearly defined objective. Why? Because it is multidimensional. It is not even defined as the probability of an interruption in supplies, without specifying the time period.
Since the British economy is over 70% dependent on fossil fuels, the starting point is with oil, gas and coal. On coal, Britain has stopped using it to generate electricity, but it is needed for steel and other industrial activities. Since coal can be sourced from lots of places, the fact that it is no longer mined in Britain is not a serious security of supply issue. As argued in the case for opening a new open-cast mine in Cumbria, it is a matter for trade and the balance of payments, but not necessary to ensure continuation of steel production. Coal can be stockpiled, though stockpiles do decay.
On oil, the world is awash with oil and from multiple sources. The days when an Arab embargo could threaten economic activity are gone. There is British North Sea oil production, but the government has chosen to curtail its further development, relying on imports instead. The closure of much of the chemical and petrochemicals industry in Britain has reduced the exposure of British industry. The big effect is on trade and the balance of payments. The long years in which Britain was a net exporter are over, and the scale of the replacement imports is significant to the overall current account deficit of the balance of payments.
Security of supply for fossil fuels in Britain comes down now to gas supplies. The moves against the British North Sea gas production mean that there is an ever-greater reliance on imports, notably from Norway and increasingly in the form of LNG. Britain takes very little gas from Russia, and the Ukrainian invasion by Russia had no impacts on British security of supplies. It did contribute to higher gas prices, and this was exacerbated by Britain’s exit from coal. Whereas other major European economies could turn back to coal – notably Germany – the British coal options were closed off. Hence the gas price spikes hit Britain harder than Germany, despite no reliance on Russian gas.
The physical security risks to imports of gas are to the pipelines and to the LNG ships and terminals. Rupturing the Norwegian pipeline would have serious impacts. Britain has virtually no storage, so the shock would be immediate. Losing 30% of Britain’s gas supplies instantaneously would provoke a major crisis. The impacts would be on industry, on heating and on electricity generation.
The electricity side might be helped out by drawing in more electricity imports from the European continent. Britain is already dependent on Europe for over 10% of its electricity, and imports depend upon the willingness and ability of European countries to provide the supplies on demand.
As with the gas pipeline to Norway, the risks here to security are obvious. The cables are vulnerable to severance by hostile parties, notably directly and indirectly by Russia. The electricity cables and the gas pipelines are subject to continuous Russia (and other) surveillance and, as with the blowing up of the Nord Stream pipelines, third parties obfuscate responsibility. Relying on interconnectors to the continent is a major risk to security of supply, and a very important hedge against a loss of gas pipeline and LNG supplies too.
Turning to electricity generation, in the absence of longer-term electricity storage, security of supply has traditionally required a surplus of capacity over and above the mean expected peak demand. With so much intermittent wind and solar generation, the capacity margin has gone from around 20% to almost 100%, and yet the system is probably less secure now than it was when 20% coal and nuclear margins did the job.
It is possible – at considerable expense – to manage the daily fluctuations with battery storage. It might provide security over a few days. Batteries so far cannot deal with longer-duration periods of high demand and low wind and solar in winter when high pressure, low wind and dark skies bring cold weather to Britain and northern Europe. Worryingly, these periods of dunkelflaute may mean that the continental countries are also stretched at the same time, and hence the availability of surplus electricity via the interconnectors may be at risk too.
Pumped-hydro storage adds a further contribution to security of supply, but again it is not long-duration and typically works on the basis of pumping water uphill at night for daytime system management.
In considering security of supply, it is therefore important to realise that having more intermittent renewables on the system worsens security and hence requires additional capacity, and, as the proportion increases, the consequences are proportionately worse.
Let’s add in the macroeconomic consequences to the economy
In the period up to the coming of abundant North Sea oil and gas, energy was a drag on the balance of payments, as significant imports were required. The OPEC oil shocks had devastating macroeconomic consequences, and it was only after 1980 that the balance of payments ceased to be a major macro concern, as North Sea oil and gas switched Britain from a significant net importer to an exporter.
That is now reverting to the state of affairs before around 1980. Current energy policy is explicitly making this situation worse. By adding lots of intermittent renewables, the import of electricity through interconnectors has gone up. By limiting the exploitation of the North Sea remaining oil and gas, imports of gas and oil are going to go up, ironically by relying more on the other side of the North Sea, which continues to be exploited by Norway.
Some of this exposure is limited by the decline of energy-intensive industries in Britain, ironically again in part caused by high energy prices in Britain. Adjusting for the changing composition of the British economy exposes just how important this switch now is.
In addition to the balance of payment impact, there is the macroeconomic impact of the highest electricity prices. High prices reduce competitiveness, and hence economic activity and economic growth. High consumer prices reduce household income, which reduces demand generally, which again reduces economic growth. Higher energy costs encourage workers to demand higher wages to compensate, and this has a further negative impact. Finally, the insulation of the electricity system from the price of gas noted above means that, if and when gas prices fall, Britain will not benefit, including from a reduction in inflation that lower gas prices might otherwise encourage. Not only has British energy policy protected consumers from getting the benefit from lower gas prices directly through the electricity price, but it has also put stickiness into inflation.
Why it is crucial to change tack right now
The government suggests that the current very high costs and prices are temporary, and that we are on the cusp of cheap renewables-driven electricity, having escaped from the clutches of dictators and high and volatile gas prices. Home-grown energy will usher in the age of Britain as a clean-energy superpower.
As explained above, this is largely not the case, and in fact we are now locked into high electricity prices for the foreseeable future through to 2040 and beyond, and insulated from the benefits of possible falls in gas prices. Contracts have repeatedly been signed with predominantly foreign investors guaranteeing prices into the distant horizon, whilst the damage to the North Sea oil and gas industry could be terminal – as it is intended to be. Britain will be bailed out by its interconnectors and gas pipelines and LNG terminals – provided that others are willing and able to supply Britain.
What is to be done? The next 20 years is a long time to wait to undo the damage
With the damage done, and with all those contracts cemented in, the economy is likely to suffer considerably. Britain will be a high-price energy country for all this period on current policies and contracts. It is unlikely that any future government could withstand the consequences, as the voters react to the economic consequences. It will probably just not stand the political test of public acceptability. Any government will have to try to ameliorate the consequences, and indeed the current government will probably have to start very soon, and long before the next election and the 2030 target date for net zero electricity.
In immediate terms, there are several steps that can make a bit of difference. They fall into two main categories: taking costs onto the government’s –and ultimately the taxpayers’ – account; and slowing down or stopping signing yet more CfDs, and notably radically cutting back on AR7.
In the “Cost of Energy Review”,[2] I proposed moving some of the levies onto the government’s account, not least those that are basically social policies and distributional. They should never have been on electricity and gas bills, a debate that goes back into the 1990s. Prices should be efficient, not distributional, and distributional consequences are matters of welfare. Trying to parcel out social costs is a strategy the Treasury has pushed across the privatised utilities. It is a mistake and an increasingly serious one, as it increasingly distorts efficiency and incentives.
Curiously, instead of going down this obvious route, this government is toying with reducing VAT on electricity, already at a considerable discount to the full rate. VAT is a general tax and generally levied across the economy. Picking special cases in taxation is a one-way ticket and it distorts through the system the impacts on intermediary users.
Cancelling or limiting AR7, and hence the next round of high-cost CfDs – notably for offshore wind – is an obvious step. The government has tacked in the opposite direction and for two reasons. It wants to ease down the headline CfD strike price for presentational reasons, and hence is extending the contracts to 20 years, therefore locking in the high prices until the mid-2040s. It also has the problem of its 2030 target for net zero electricity. AR7 is one of the last chances it has to prove it is on track. In other words, customers and industry will pay the high costs for 20 years to cover the consequences of a short-term net zero target (which will not be met anyway).
Cancelling or reducing AR7 has other advantages. Recall that a lot of offshore wind is curtailed off the system and that a great expansion (and cost) of the grid is needed to take power from Scotland to the markets in the south. Having made the mistake of building wind farms in remoter locations, notably off Scotland’s east coast, the errors should not be compounded further. There really is no case to be made for more offshore Scottish wind, and even less for offshore Scottish floating wind turbines.
The previous government signed up to the Hinkley CfD, and this government has signed up to the Sizewell C RAB. As noted above, the costs are stunning – over £10 billion per GW. These are now locked in. The choice is now all about further PWRs and the SMR programme. On SMRs, the design of a programme of SMRs is crucial, and the consequences of only contracting for one or two to see whether they work will repeat the high-cost errors of the past. Nuclear may make sense in this programme context, and yet there is little evidence that the government is up to this challenge.
What else can be done? The gas issue looms. There are good reasons for thinking that a lot more gas will be needed, not least to keep the lights on in a future intermittent renewables-dominated system. Instead of just leaving gas to wither away (which it will, as it is rendered uneconomic because the renewables drive the wholesale price to zero, free from the consequences given their CfDs), there needs to be a serious plan for gas. One option – again considered in the Cost of Energy Review – is a strategic gas reserve, with a RAB basis for remunerating the capital and a pass-through for the higher gas costs from the volatility in demand caused by the intermittency of the renewables. This should extend to providing for proper maintenance expenditure on the existing gas transmission and distribution networks.
There have been proposals to reduce or abolish carbon prices, notably on electricity generation. This is an extremely complex issue, not least because of the impacts via the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the EU CBAM (carbon border adjustment mechanism). Though the EU is itself reconsidering the scale of the carbon costs, and recalibrating the European Green Deal, as long as there is a carbon price on the other side of the interconnectors, simply removing carbon prices in Britain will cause serious issues to arise.
The carbon price has the merit of being a key (and, in resource costs, cheapest) way of signalling to those with the lowest costs of reducing their emissions. There is a good case for an economy-wide common carbon price. As long as there is an objective of decarbonisation, then to remove the carbon price increases the cost of achieving the objective.
It is of course open for political parties to retreat from decarbonisation, and in repealing the Climate Change Act (CCA), this may well be the consequence. It may be electorally popular, and it would reduce bills. The switch to electricity would continue, and the absence of net zero targets would not necessarily inhibit the switch to electric cars. Wind and solar could compete in the market. If they really are nine times cheaper, no policy or net zero target is needed.
The sad fact is that they are not cheaper, and that is precisely why policies to support low-carbon technologies are needed. Without net zero targets, and without the CCA, a government could still encourage decarbonisation. Whether it will make much difference remains to be seen, particularly since the net zero targets are for territorial carbon production, not carbon consumption, and hence encourage offshoring emissions and with them energy-intensive industries.
There are, of course, more radical options, and if the objective is to reduce energy and especially electricity costs, these will be necessary for any government in the 2030s and 2040s. Radical options require starting with a blank piece of paper, taking a cold hard look at the technology options, and setting new stakes in the ground. The idea that a modern economy with rising energy demands for firm power can get by with mainly wind and solar is an implausible one. Some wind and some solar have roles to play, but not the leading roles. Britain already has enough offshore wind. It has lots of roofs (rather than high-value agricultural land) upon which to install solar, but neither can provide cheap firm power.
[1] Ed Miliband post on X, August 24th 2022, https://x.com/Ed_Miliband/status/1562444641236316161.
[2] Helm, D.H. (2017), ‘Cost of Energy Review’.
This article (British energy policy – not cheap, not home-grown and not secure) was created and published by Professor Sir Dieter Helm and is republished here under “Fair Use”
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